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Chapter I
Introduction
1.1 Background of the study
The growth of maritime community has become one of the major concerns of IMO, 
particularly in the safety aspect when it comes to ship operations. It has been noted 
that since the start of the century, and even before, ships have been changing in terms 
of number, size, and methods of operation. Together with these changes, a vast 
number of casualties with an average loss of 1915 lives occur each year, as per 
Lloyd’s Register (World Casualty Statistics). In retrospect, the extent of major 
casualties, the most controversial ones, led to the revision of many IMO Instruments 
and further adoption of new Regulations, which are defined in Chapter 3. However, 
we still cannot escape the fiiry of a tragedy due to human factors. It has been proven 
by researchers that about 80% of all accidents were caused by human errors.
To have maritime safety at its maximum level, IMO has adopted the Revised STCW 
1978 Convention in 1995, better known as ‘STCW 95.’ The reason of which is to 
have a globalised set of Regulation to be strictly followed coupled with a so called 
concept known as the white list. The stringent requirements of the new Convention 
has caused great impact in all areas of the maritime industry, with education and 
training as one of the highlights.
Maritime institutions cannot get away from the enforcing arm of this Convention. 
The Philippines has earned its reputation as one of the major supplier of about 15% of 
all seafarers to the international fleet. Based on this, the country is composed of 
around 122 maritime institutions fragmented all over its archipelago. Getting as close 
as possible to the STCW 95 requirements, changes and updates have to be carried out 
by these schools, including changes in the curriculum.
This study also encourages MET institutions in the country to further develop 
theoretical learning objectives for the future merchant marine officers through the 
introduction of maritime casualties. The idea is to open young minds in the reality of 
accidents. Hence; attitudes, values, and practices towards works would be improved.
1.2 Purpose of the study
It is of great important that a study of the academic curriculum, highlighting on 
Bachelor of Science in Marine Transportation major in Nautical Studies (BSMT-NS), 
has to be carried out to answer the needs of the maritime industry as well as 
improving individual knowledge and skills, eventually leading to competency. With 
the adoption of STCW 95, it focuses mainly on the competency and skill of an 
individual to carry out his task.
The author aim to examine the areas within the curriculum wherein the possible 
inclusion of maritime casualty could be placed. Aside from the author’s aim, there are 
also a number objectives which will specifically assist and justify the purpose of the 
study. Such objectives are as follows:
• To identify the sources of major maritime casualties;
• To select, categorise, and evaluate statistical data;
• To examine to basis of the present PMMA curriculum with a view to the 
potential use of such data;
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• To develop a course proposal for the inclusion of casualty topic;
• To consider how modem technology and teaching methodologies can be 
utilised to assist this process.
• To make proposals for the introduction of casualty case studies with the 
PMMA curriculum utilizing new methods of learning.
1.3 Scope of the study
Realising that a maritime casualty has a great influence on the attitude and behaviour 
of an individual, the study will deal only on this from a general point of view and not 
go deeper because of its complexity and broadness. The author has done the study in 
such a way that statistical data was gathered to show the extent of the casualty and 
categorising the causes and its twin factors. As a result, one could realise the impact 
of this to the maritime world, to the marine environment, and the pain and suffering of 
those people who have lost loved ones.
Apart from this, the study also focus on the PMMA’s curriculum by identifying its 
basis with regards to the effect of STCW 95. As it will be the first step towards the 
justification of inclusion. In doing so, the author has conducted a research study of 
relevant facts and figures that will support the study, using the WMU library and its 
variety of important information. The internet also became the tool for research, as it 
gave the author the necessary ideas in various strategic lay-out of tables for casualty 
statistics.
Field studies, though with small emphasis, have contributed with some discussions. 
Almost half of the discussion presented in the study was based on lectures conducted 
by both WMU professors and visiting professors. In addition, interviews were carried 
out with a few visiting professors with expertise on the subject.
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Finally, it is worth mentioning that informal discussions with co-students, with various 
expertise, have highlighted some critical areas in the study. With their knowledge and 
experience, the author had surpassed some difficulties in achieving the objectives of 
the study.
1.4 Relevance of the study
It is timely that the academy should act on the improvement of its MET system. Now 
that IMO is very stringent when it comes to the competency of an individual by 
creating STCW 95. At this time the new Convention is gradually being enforced. 
There is no room for complacency. Learning through mistakes and the lessons from it 
could unlock the door towards the goal of success by gaining proper knowledge and 
skill in the study of casualties and its lessons. At this point, they may be able to assess 
any situation as early as possible, thereby avoiding an unpleasant event.
With the inclusion of maritime casualties in the PMMA curriculum, the author have 
reasons to believe that the PMMA’s role as a model institution in the country will be 
justified because of the liberal education and training being transferred to the young 
and future merchant marine officers.
1.5 Order of presentation
The study intends as much as possible to focus on the statistics and reasons for 
casualties to be part of the PMMA’s curriculum. In order to present a justifiable 
conclusion, the initial study begins with statistical analysis of casualty data in Chapter 
2 and tries to capture the attention of the readers to its significance. Chapter 3 
discusses the MET system regarding some problems in dissemination of casualty 
information. Within the said Chapter, the author also tries to highlight the STCW 
Code A requirements for MET. Included is a list of case studies and references. 
Chapter 4 discusses innovative concepts that could be applied in the introduction of a 
new subject. Along with the conclusion are recommendations and proposals that have
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been highlighted to achieve the objectives of the study. This will hopefully carry out 
strong relationships between maritime institutions and others concerned in MET.
Chapter II
Anatomy of Major Maritime Casualty
2.1 Definition of terms
Casualty investigation is a broad topic. Therefore, an attempt will be made to limit its 
broadness to cover only its common type and reason. Before investigating maritime 
casualties, the meaning of the topic itself should be well defined. Based on some 
maritime materials such as books, publications, etc. There are numerous definitions 
more or less they with the same thoughts. An accident and a casualty are words used 
interchangeably to an unfortunate event. A maritime casualty can be defined as an 
unwanted occurrence that have happened in the ocean or in the sea, resulting to 
misfortunate environmental/property damage or injuries/loss of lives. This is 
according to definitions given by R. L. Kuhlman (1977, p. 4) and Y. Xinzhai (1994, p. 
30). The authors first identify the necessary factors relating to a maritime casualty 
and then these are summarise as follows;
The most essential factors containing a maritime casualty are that:
a) It is an unplanned, unexpected event.
This means that a maritime casualty is an event, it happens by 
chance and the happening of the event is not caused by any human 
intention or deliberation.
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b) It is related to ship(s).
This means that a ship or ships is/are involved in such an event.
c) Damages were caused.
Without any damage, we could not say that an event is a casualty.
A damage includes: (1) human beings - death or injury to persons, (2) 
property-financial, material or natural resource, as well as damages to 
environment.
2.1.1 Categories of Casualty
The following definition is based on the Lloyd’s casualty statistics. They are defined 
as follows:
Foundered. This type of casualty which caused vessels to sank is due to external 
forces acting on the ships’ hull as a result of rough weather conditions or (typhoon), 
leaks, breaking in two, etc. But not as the same consequence as that of a missing 
vessels because this type has traces of the mishap like floating debris or one or more 
survivors.
Missing. A ship is considered as missing if it suddenly disappeared or sank with 
unknown reason and no news within a reasonable period after the casualty. In other 
words, ships which sank without a trace or survivor.
Fire/Explosion. This is a type of casualty which has occurred from a fire and/or an 
explosion. But a fire and/or an explosion after a collision, grounding, etc. is not listed 
under this category.
Collision. This type is a result of two ships coming into contact or one being hit by 
the other, regardless of whether at anchor, moored or underway. But a ship hitting an 
underwater objects does not include in this category.
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Contact. This is a casualty loss as a result of striking an external structure like oil rigs 
or platforms, but not ships or alike.
Wrecked/Stranded. This t3ipe is due to a ship touching the bottom or underwater 
objects.
U)st, etc. This category has three types, namely:
• War Loss/Hostility damage. Loss due to hostile acts
• HullMachinery Damage. Loss due to hull/machinery failure , but not 
attributed to any other category
• Miscellaneous. Loss which cannot be classified under any of the above 
mentioned definitions
The following is a different set of casualties, categorised in a different approach based 
on the types of casualties which usually occur within Philippine water. Philippine . 
casualties are sometimes differently defined to international statistics.
Drifted. Vessels included here are those without headway but still afloat as a result of 
machinery failure.
Grounded. Casualty resulting from rough weather conditions or human error.
Capsized. Vessels lost due to rough seas, poor stability, or human error.
Rammed These are vessels which come into contact with other vessels at anchor or 
floating structures (fixed or being towed) as well as hitting debris.
Sunk. This category has also got the same meaning as that of those ships which have 
foundered.
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2.2 The Approach in Identifying Casualty and Its Causes
In order to have a proper understanding of maritime casualties, statistical data must be 
investigated to categorise them and find the similarities. In the following pages of this 
chapter, the author intends to highlight the causes of casualties by first discussing 
domestic casualties and then international casualties.
2.3 Maritime Casualties in the Philippines
Statistics on maritime accidents from 1996 to 1997 can be found in the maritime 
accident files of PCG (Philippine Coast Guard). The results of any in-depth analysis 
of these data are not intended to set regulation but to indicate that lessons are needed 
to better understand the maritime casualties.
2.4 The History of Maritime Casualties in the Philippines
The MA^ Dona Paz (2,215 GRT) collided with the M/T Vector (629 GRT) and sank 
in the vicinity of Dumali Point, in Tablas Strait, at about 2200H in the evening of 20 
December 1987. An estimated number of over four thousand passengers and crew 
members died, or are still listed as missing. The tragedy could be considered as the 
worse ever in the history of world maritime casualties. The MA^ Marilyn (2,855 
GRT) was caught by Typhoon Unsang and sank ofFMasbate, at around 1500H in the 
afternoon of 24 October 1988. An estimated 500 crew members and passengers died, 
or are still missing. In 1994, a passenger vessel, MV Cebu City collided with a 
Singaporean-based cargo vessel, MV Kota Suria, in Manila Bay resulting in 73 dead 
and 41 people missing. Recently, in 1997, a fire destroyed another inter-island ship. 
Super Ferry 7, while docked in the Port of Manila. Only two people were injured but 
the lost was estimated to be about 30.4 million dollars in terms of property damage.
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2.5 Casualty Data
Number of Monthly Accidents During 1996
■••Accident Type •■■■ '■v-Mdr.5: MM. Aug Sep Oct •■•■Totalv-
Drifted - 1 - - • • - - - - 1 2
Grounded 4 - - 1 1 - “ 1 - 3 1 11
Collided -
Caught Fire - -
Capsized 2 3 1 1 1 - 3 3 1 3 3 21
Sunk 3 1 3 1 1 1 5 2 3 2 2 3 27
Rammed - - - - - - - 1 • - - - 1
Total 9 5 4 3 3 1 5 6 7 3 8 8 62
Source: Board of Marine Inquiry, Headquarters Philippine Coast Guard.
Table 2.1
Table 1, 2, and Figure 1, on the next pages, show the number of maritime accidents, 
from 1996 to 1997. Table 3, on the following page indicates the SAR records on the 
number of casualties involved in the accidents, during that period.
Number of Monthly Accidents During 1997
■•■Accident Type ■■ Jan ilFsbS Juu ?:Sug>:':- S’SepS: Oct Dec Total
Grounded 2 1 - • - - 2 - - 5
Collided 2 3 - - 2 - - 1 2 10
Drifted 5 4 - - 1 - - - - 10
Caught Fire 2 - 1 1 - - 1 - 1 6
Capsized - 3 - - 1 2 - 3 - 9
Sunk 2 2 5 - 2 2 - 2 1 - 16
Rammed 1 - - - - - - - - - 1
Total 14 13 6 1 6 4 3 6 4 - - 57
Source: Board of Marine Inquiry, Headquarters Philippine Coast Guard. 
Note: No casualty data available &om October to December 1997
Table 2.2
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14 Total Number of Casualties. 1996-1997
BCasulaties during 1996 ^Casualties during 1997
Note: No data for the last three months of 1997
Figure 2.1
Maritime Casualties, 1996 - 1997
ICasualty Total
Persons:
Rescued 807 347 1154
Missing 46 20 66
Bodies recovered 81 48 129
Total 934 415 1349
Source: Headquarters Philippine Coast Guard (HPCG).
Table 2.3
Figure 1, shows the total number of casualties on a monthly basis during the period 
1996 to 1997 (no available data from October to December in 1997). The casualties 
gradually fluctuate and increase during the rainy season (the typhoon months) 
between September and March.
11
The (i;!ominunaI Tropical Cyclones that Affected Weather Conditions
Number Year A B Sub-total C Total
1 1982 9 7 16 4 20
2 1983 10 6 16 7 23
3 1984 8 7 15 5 20
4 1985 8 4 12 5 17
5 1986 11 7 18 3 21
6 1987 7 6 13 3 16
7 1988 9 9 18 2 20
8 1989 9 6 15 4 19
9 1990 . 6 7 13 7 20
Total 77 59 136 40 176
Source: JICA1992.
Note: A=TC Affecting the Philippines, centre crossed the country.
B=TC Affecting the Philippines, centre did not cross country.
C= Cyclones not Affecting country.
Table 2.4
The Philippine has an average number of fifteen (15) typhoons per year. Data of 
tropical cyclones’ activity is shown on Table 4. This is considerably helpful in proving 
the last statement. In Armexes 1 and 2, the tropical cyclones’ path and the locations 
of where casualties often can be seen.
Shares of Accidents Types, 1996-1997
Rammed
2%
Drifted
10%
Capsized
25%
Grounded
13%
CoITided 
8% 
Caught Rre 
5%
Figure 2.2
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From Table 1 and 2, and Figure 2, we can read the percentage of maritime accidents 
by type, from 1996 to 1997. Accidents resulting in sunk vessels rank first, followed 
by vessels that capsized, grounded, drifted, collided, caught fire, and rammed. The 
number of vessels, involved in accidents, categorised as rammed, are the lowest. 
Accidents, resulting as both sunk and capsized have the largest share, of 62%, of all 
maritime accidents. The result is mainly due to ships stability.
Maritime Casualty, by Type, 1996-1997
Figure 2.3
From previous graphs, it is obvious that the year 1996 had the most number of 
casualties than that of 1997, but there are similar patterns between the two periods. 
Both years have their highest peaks of casualties somewhere in the middle of the rainy 
or typhoon seasons.
This concludes that typhoons are major contributing factor of casualties in the 
Philippines. But, casualties also occur in calm weather. A break down of this will be 
further discussed.
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2.6 Causes of maritime casualties in the Philippines
The conditions for accident occurrences are divided into two sub-categories, namely: 
due to tropical cyclones and rough weather conditions, and under calm sea conditions. 
The total number of casualties in the two categories have the same pattern, shown in 
Figure 3. Some main causes of these casualties will be discussed later within this 
chapter. The vessels involved in maritime casualties vary in number, types, and 
causes, during these conditions.
2.6.1 Sub-categories of conditions during the time of the accidents 
i. Tropical cyclones and rough weather conditions
Maritime casualties, totalling 30 in 1996 and 24 in 1997, accounting for 53.5% and 
42.1% of the total annual number of casualties respectively, were caused by tropical 
cyclone and rough weather condition (including rough seas and big waves).
Tropical cyclones which track across and directly and indirectly affect the Philippines 
should be given particular attention. Tropical cyclones often hit fishing grounds off 
Batangas and Subic Bay, and cause extensive damage to fishing boats. In the Visayan 
Region, vessels of 250 GRT and up also have met accidents for the same reason. See 
Annexes 1 and 2. According to available statistics, other listed causes of maritime 
casualties are rough seas, big waves and bad weather in general.
a. Calm sea conditions
Vessels involved in maritime casualties can be found with great variety depending on 
the routes and the level of vessels seaworthiness and the knowledge of good 
seamanship among the crew. A potentially dangerous situation during calm sea 
conditions is when the officers and crew are lulled into a sense of complacency. 
Emergency readiness and reactions may then not be of high level, like in bad weather 
condition.
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The number of vessels involved in maritime casualties, during calm sea condition, 
totalled 26 in 1996 and 33 in 1997, constituting 46.4% and 57.9% of the total annual 
number of casualties respectively.
2.6.2 Drifted Vessels
Vessels involved in drifting incidents have an accident mostly caused by engine 
trouble. An estimated 4% of the total number of drifting incidents in the years 1996 
and 1997 belong to fishing vessels, and the remaining 6% is various vessels of at least 
61.00 grt. These fishing vessels were made by local craftsmen who had obtained their 
knowledge and skills through experience given by their fore-fathers. In addition to 
this, most of these vessels had wooden hull and often equipped with pre-fabricated 
second-hand diesel engines acquired from second-hand markets of land vehicles. To 
keep such a motor running, a simple engine tune-up is required.
2.6.3 Grounded Vessels
About 50% of all groundings occurred during night time. When ship’s officers are on 
the bridge on ships that have a routine time schedule between certain islands. 
Navigation becomes routine. The vessel’s course line is usually pre-fixed on the 
chart. The officer of the watch and his look-out become veiy familiar with the route. 
The navigator learn to know land marks and lighthouses by heart. This type of 
navigation does not take much consideration of position fixes. This means, that 
failure to confirm the ship’s position on the chart and possible misjudgements may 
lead to grounding.
Sudden vdnd shift in typhoons and tropical cyclones also caused vessels to run 
aground. As shown in Annexes 1 and 2, most groundings are located at narrow 
passages between the islands. Ferries have their fixed charted routes near the coast 
and may not bother to adjust their routes, away from the coast, in the event of an 
incoming typhoon or tropical cyclone. Shipowners, despite repeated accidents, seems
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not inclined to take further preventive measures like training and purchasing of 
relevant equipment. Poor visibility due to heavy rain and mechanical engine fmlures 
also contribute to this type of accidents.
2.6.4 Vessels in collision
Casualties related to collisions were all attributed to human error, in terms of 
inadequate look-out. Most of these casualties occurred at night. Collision between 
ferries (steeled hull vessels) and fishing vessels (wooden hull vessel) are quite 
common. Fishing vessels often navigate without lights during night time.
2.6.5 Vessels Caught Fire
This type of maritime accidents were mainly caused by the lack of proper fire 
preventive and protective precautions. In other words, these accidents were caused 
by simple carelessness.
2.6.6 Vessels Capsized
Among maritime accidents, there were also reports of motor bancas capsizing or 
sinking, because of engine trouble while navigating in bad weather. In the same way, 
smaller crafts under 10 GRT, are very prone to be damaged during bad weather. It 
can also be assumed that vessels and boats sail out to sea, without obtaining prior 
notice and knowledge of storm warnings. Weather information is simply disregarded. 
In the case of bigger vessels, of around 200 GRT and above, the most probable 
reason of accidents could be, bad stability and the ship’s construction.
2.6.7 AIIision/Ramming
There were also cases of vessels that rammed wharves, piers, and other vessels at 
anchor. The reason is mainly due to misjudgement which falls under human error.
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2.6.8 Vessels at total loss
Heavy rough seas and strong wind from typhoons or tropical cyclones have caused 
vessels to sink. The reason is usually difficult to trace. It could be presumed, that the 
reasons were unseaworthiness and human negligence.
2.7 World shipping background
Ships have played an important role in the marine world since the time of the galleon 
era when some well-known people went to conquer or investigate unknown places. 
Ships were also used to exchange goods between countries.around the world. In the 
early part of the century, ships became useful to transport passengers.
Ships were further recognised because of their capacity to move military troops and 
war machines. Ships have always advanced in terms of sizes, types, and technology. 
Many accidents and incidents from near misses to disasters have occurred during 
many years of sailing.
2.8 World casualty history
Aside from substandard ships, no matter how good a vessel is properly equipped or 
manned or has met the international standards, accidents still do happen each year. 
Some of the worst and controversial accidents can be traced back from the famous 
Titanic, which have struck an iceberg in the night of 12 April 1912, around 1502 lives 
were lost. The recent MV Estonia tragedy which capsized in the Baltic Sea also 
caused an alarming loss of 852 lives. These are just two of many known tragedies 
that have shocked the world. Why do they continue to happen? What really is the 
reason for an accident? How can be prevented?
Above are questions that first comes to one mind when an accident has occurred. 
Almost all casualty investigations have pin-pointed the probable root of such 
casualties, and this have further ended up in the adoption ^d revision of
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international instruments, see Table 5. But still, inspite of these instruments, accidents 
find its way through. Perhaps, accidents never can be fully prevented but minimised 
by a study, an analysis lessons learned from them.
Some of the iVVprld^sxMajoi* Disasters
Year Name of Vessel Nature of Incident Casualty Instruments Adopted
1912 Titanic Struck an iceberg in North 1,502 passengers SOLAS 14
Atlantic and crew
1967 Torrey Canyon Stranded in the Scilly Isles First massive MARPOL73/STCW78
marine pollution
1987 Herald of Free Enterprise Capsized And sank in the 188 Passengers Guidelines on Safety
entrance to Zeebrugge and Crew Management (19/10/89)
1989 Exxon Valdez Stranded in Prince William Oil spilled of OPA90
Sound almost 40,000
tons
1990 Scandinavian Star Fire broke out in the North ISO passengers ISM Code
Sea
1994 Estonia Capsized and sank in the 852 passengers Revised STCW 78
Baltic Sea and crew
Sources: Nutec Maritime Alliance, 1997. In: CARD NEWS; Capt. R. A. Cahill, 1988. ‘Disasters at
Sea’; The Joint Accident Investigation Commission of Estonia, Finland and Sweden, 1995; M. 
Shanahan and A. Krushelnycky, 1990. In; The Sunday express. As modified by the author.
Table 2.5
2.9 World Casualty Survey
To find out the reasons and other factors relating to maritime casualties, the first 
approach at this stage could be the collection of some statistical data. Most statistical 
data does not give exact figures because some countries’ information system is too 
bad. Casualty investigation for some countries is just a fault finding scheme, rather 
than finding its cause for future safety development. However, it is not the author’s 
ambition to develop safety measures but to present a broad statistical information of 
the causes and some key factors that may have led to maritime casualties.
World Casualty Statistics
Incident Type 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Total
Foundered 72 111 94 95 91 99 83 645
Missing 6 3 3 1 2 2 2 19
Fire/E}q>Iosion 32 37 35 35 29 27 22 217
Collision 21 36 25 20 16 17 29 164
Contact 9 13 3 10 5 7 1 48
Wreck/stranded 44 45 44 52 36 31 36 288
Lost, etc. 4 13 9 6 5 5 6 48
Total 188 258 213 219 184 188 179 1429
Source: Lloyd’s Register, ‘Casualty Return’, 1990 to 1996
Table 2.6
Table 6 above indicates that the year 1991 showed a significant number of casualties 
followed by the year 1993. It is noticeable that the total number of losses each year 
fluctuates as it gradually decreases until the end of the year 1996. This also shows 
that no matter how stringent an IMO Instrument, like the Revised STCW 1978, can 
be, an accident would still occur.
2.10 Causes of Casualties
2.10.1 Foundered
Vessels involved in this type of accidents from 1990 to 1996 constitutes the highest 
number of accidents, being 45.1 per cent. In terms of gross tonnage, vessels which 
carry liquid or solid cargo in bulk have the highest figure compared to other types of 
vessels. General cargo vessels come second followed by fishing vessels. It was 
known that vessels sank due to rough weather condition, leaks, and breaking in two.
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2.10.2 Missing
Accidents accounting to 1.3 per cent of all total losses belongs to vessels missing. 
1990 had the highest number of this type and then stays at a constant number from 
1994 to 1996. It was assumed that these vessels vanished for unknown reason.
2.10.3 Fire/Explosion
A percentage of 15.2 accounting from the total losses, from 1990 to 1996, of all kinds 
of incidents has been constituted by this type. This incident occurs on all types of 
vessels. Fire or explosion occurs on tankers while discharging or being repaired in 
dock yards or it started out from machinery spaces. But most vessels which usually 
suffered an accident like this were either general cargo or fishing vessels, mainly due 
to ignition caused by sparks or human negligence.
2.10.4 Collision
About 11.5 per cent of the total accidents occurred from 1990 to 1996 was 
constituted by this type of accident. General cargo and fish vessels were amongst 
those vessels which are noted to be having the greatest number of this case, in which 
the former is leading. This usually occurs during poor visibility, and may have been 
possibly caused by some factors like poor look-out, lack of communication, unable to 
determine targets with radar, and simply misjudgement.
2.10.5 Contact
Vessels involved in this situation constitutes 3.4 per cent of the total casualty losses 
from 1990 to 1996. In terms number of casualties, fishing vessels give a significant 
rate of about forty per cent of the total losses from 1990 to 1996. This is followed by 
general cargo ships with a rate of thirty-three per cent of the total losses. It was 
declared that these fish catching vessels came in contact in shallow waters during 
heavy weather condition or typhoon, in which some of them experienced some kind of 
engine trouble during that condition where there were drifted towards the reef On
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the other hand, the usual factors causing general cargo ships to meet such accident 
were, firstly, coming into contact with some submerged objects and, secondly, have 
been drifted while at anchored by typhoon or heavy weather condition. Further 
factors were leakage, as a result of floating objects being hit, causing ships to capsized 
and sunk.
2.10.6 Wreck/Stranded
This type constitutes 20.2 per cent of the total losses, from 1990 to 1996. This is the 
second from the top’s worst number of casualties from 1990 to 1996. The year which 
has the highest rate of casualty was 1993, with a total number of 52 cases, see table 6. 
The highest ship type in this category is general cargo with a rate of 45 per cent of the 
total losses, followed once again by fishing vessels with a total rate of 28 per cent. 
Bulk carriers were third on the list constituting to a 9 per cent total loss. This is 
followed by Tankers with a small percentage of 5. The common factors resulting in 
wreck/stranding were due to typhoon or heavy weather condition. In addition to this, 
some of these ships experienced some kind of mechanical problems, like engine 
trouble and steering gear failure, during rough weather condition.
2.10.7 Other losses
Vessels involved in this case constitutes a rate of 3.4 per cent of the total losses from 
1990 to 1996. These are vessels which are not immediately recorded in the list of 
casualties, which are still included for statistical purposes. General cargo having the 
highest casualty rate of 27 per cent, followed by fishing vessels with 21 per cent share. 
Tankers and bulk carriers also comes in with 17 and 13 per cent consecutively. It was 
also noted that these vessels suffered the same faith as those mentioned in the other 
causes of casualties.
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2.10.8 Total loss
The number of total ship loss during the past seven years, from 1990 to 1996, reached 
a total of 1429. General cargo topping the list with a rate of 41 per cent. This is 
followed by fishing vessels with 30 per cent. The third one is bulk carrier whose got a 
rate of 7 per cent, which is also inunediately followed by 6 per cent rate by tankers. 
An astonishing average of 1915 loss of lives each year, from all ship types, within 
1990 to 1996, see table 7. On the part of merchant ships, it is noted that 
passenger/ro-ro ships show the greatest number of human casualties, even if the total 
number of ships involved is very few comparing to that of those general cargo and 
fishing vessels. In terms of total tonnage loss, tankers is the most significant of all 
ship types, having a total of 2.28 million gross tonnage loss, from 1990 to 1996.
Summaries Of Lives Lost from All Ship Types, 1990 to 1996
Ship Types 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Total
Oil 9 48 2 15 70 2 3 149
Bulk dry 94 154 28 41 148 84 50 599
General cargo 72 217 78 219 149 192 168 1095
Passenger/general cargo 13 39 - - 145 2 — 199
Ro-ro cargo 15 - - 5 51 28 1 100
Passenger/ro-ro cargo - 608 1 58 876 — 342 1885
Passenger - 17 9 - - 3 4 33
All cargo carrying shiplypes 288 1103 148 401 1474 325 645 4384
Other ship types 389 1204 246 504 1552 379 690 4964
Total 880 3390 512 1243 4465 1015 1903 13408
Source: Lloyd’s Register,’World Casua ty Statistics’. 
Table 2.7
Each type of ship varies in the number of accident, but each of them have their own 
impact, especially to the media, where passenger/ro-ro and tankers were the most
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controversial ones, in terms of human lives lost and pollution to the marine 
environment. Because of this, general cargo and fishing vessels, together with some 
merchant ships have very little impact, eventhough they show a great number of 
casualties around the world.
2.11 Major factors leading to casualties
The essential part of an investigation are the key factors that contributed to an 
accident or incident. Without such knowledge, pointing out the origins relating to 
that event would be difficult. Therefore, these key factors behind the casualty must be 
understood in order to analyse the causes of these accidents. The following is a good 
discussion of these factors, based from the book ‘Introduction to Investigation.’
Oftenly, the cause of accident has always been associated by a combination of factors 
coming together at the same time. One factor aggravates the other(s), could have, if 
not minor, a disastrous effect. In understanding the factors of the causes of casualties, 
five major elements should be considered, namely: the equipment, the cargo, the age 
of the vessel, the environment, and the human being.
2.11.1 Equipment
These are the tools and machinery people works with. Such machinery involve items 
like main and auxiliary engines and all those associated with it and in the machinery 
space; including also are the cranes, winches, and windlasses. Tools, on the other 
hand, involve navigational aids like radar, ARP A, VHP, echo sounders, rate of turn 
indicator, bridge and engine room alarming devices, and all those consisting the 
navigational bridge, as well as, safety and survival equipment. In the past accidents, 
substandard or improper design of equipment has noted to be one of the key factors 
of past undesirable events, in which safety has been compromised.
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2.11.2 Cargo
These are goods being shipped by ships, which is also another key factor of a 
casualty. Some cargoes were proven to be toxic and fatal to human health and to the 
environment. Safety handling, precautions, and operations are indicated in the IMDG 
Code. Cargo, such as grains and a like, is likely subject to shifting, because it also has 
the same characteristics as fluid, which could cause a vessel to list permanently 
eventually leading to capsizing and then sinking of the ship. Other cargo, in parcels, if 
not properly stowed or lashed would surely cause bad effects, like damage to cargo 
itself and to the ship.
2.11.3 Age of the vessel
Old vessels require good maintenance and periodic survey and dry-docking. This is 
because things get worn out and deteriorate as time goes by. As an example, it is the 
normal tradition of seafarers to chip away rusts and then paint the ships’ plating. 
Subsequently, affecting the ships’ plating and hull integrity. This could be one of the 
reasons why some ships break in two during heavy seas.
2.11.4 Environment
This element involve the physical surroundings including the ship itself and the 
prevailing weather condition. When we talk of ships, this means that the whole of a 
ship is the work place of seafarers wherein some parts of it could place a crew in a 
dangerous situation if safety practices were not being carried out, like working up the 
mast. Prevailing weather condition, like heavy weather or typhoon, is the most 
obvious factor which is often aggravated by unforeseen one(s). This is one factor 
which struck many vessels of casualties.
2.11.5 Human factor
Both the general management of the company and the seafarers themselves are 
involve here. It has been ‘established’ that about eighty per cent of the accident were
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due to human errors. The efficiency of the seafarers sometimes depends on the 
education and training he or she received, motivation, and equipment used. 
Substandard school will likely take part with the inefficiency of a seafarer. 
Furthermore, a highly trained crew, without any appreciation and benefits for a job 
well done, may affect his or her assigned task. Apart from these, the management 
role and relationship to the employee also plays a critical role here. For instance, a 
master requesting the management that something has to be done, it should be 
answered and acted upon, because the master is one responsible for the safety of the 
ship and he sees and experience things that the management never did, while ship is at 
sea. A good example of this is the case of the ^Herald of Free Enterprise ’, wherein 
the master had been ignored of his request, for the installation of an alarming device 
on the bridge, indicating whether the bow door is properly locked or not.
Individually or in combination, the five mentioned elements in the daily operation of a 
ship (equipment, cargo, age of vessel, environment, and human factor) provide the 
key factors of the causes of casualties.
2.12 Other Causes and Factors Leading to Casualty
As specified before, management relationship, also, has a direct involvement with the 
causes of accidents. This was analysed by the use of the late H.W. Heinrich’s 
‘Domino principle’. It has been used widely in the past to reach the philosophy of 
accident prevention and loss control.
2.12.1 Lack of Management Control
Lack of management ‘control’ is the first domino in the sequence of events of an 
accident. Control refers to the one of the four functions of any managerial people, 
namely: planning, organising, leading, and controlling. These fimctions relate to the 
work of all top level management members. The common areas for lack of 
management control are, as follows;
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• An inadequate program and inadequate program knowledge.
• An inadequate program standards and inadequate knowledge of program 
standards.
• Failure to perform to standards or to manage employee compliance to 
standards.
In order to do the work properly, the management and its employee are require to 
perform to each area of the company standard set. As a front liner supervisor in the 
top management bracket, knowing the required program standard and measuring his 
own actual performance and that of his people enables him to take corrective action 
before losses occur.
As an example, a company standard of an annual inspection of all their ships is 
required to be followed. If inspection was not carried out, it would result in future 
occurrence of incident or even tragedy. Furthermore, allowing substandard practices 
to exit. Thus, setting the first domino to fall, which is followed by the immediate 
ones down the line.
2.12.2 Basic Cause(s) - Origin(s)
Since incident originate directly from substandard practices (immediate causes) due to 
poor management techniques. The certain basic causes of some incidents have been 
referred to as root causes, indirect causes, underlying causes or real causes. The 
following are two groups classifying ‘basic causes’:
• Human Factors, involve:
Knowledge and skill deficit 
Inadequate motivation 
Physical or mental problems
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• Functional factors, involve:
- improper work standards
- improper design or maintenance
- improper purchasing standards
- Abnormal usage
The first of the two groups of basic causes explain why substandard practices were 
being engaged by people. In a logical way thinking, a man will only do and follow 
what has been taught and told, or even shown, of him or her. Therefore, education 
and training is very critical for the efficiency and performance of the task.
Like the first group, functional factors explain why substandard conditions exit. 
Equipment are being purchased without due consideration to adequate standards. 
Thus, inadequacy in the structural design standard has been permitted. Substandard 
machines and equipment and abusive and mis-usage of the formers cause substandard 
performance and conditions, as well as, resulting in inefficient and waste operation, 
presenting hazards to people, property, and environment.
The mentioned basic causes are the origin(s) clearly elaborated, leading to 
substandard acts, practices, and conditions. Failure to identifying these origins, may 
initiate the possibility of chain reaction resulting to undesirable circumstances.
2.12.3 Immediate Cause(s) - Symptoms
The opportunity for the occurrence of substandard practices and conditions (called 
errors) starts from the basic causes. Identifying the meaning of substandard practice 
or condition (error), which based from the same book ‘Introduction to Casualty’,
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It is any alteration from the required and accepted standard or 
practice. This involve the human acts and the conditions related 
to physical things.
A good supervisor, who manages to keep up with the standards, focus his attention 
not only on his employee’s job performance but also of himself In this way, he 
always finds himself monitoring for possible substandard practices, in which he 
applies his knowledge of cause-and-effect relationships to his jurisdiction. Unsafe 
acts and unsafe conditions frequently referred by immediate causes is based on safety 
references. They are defined as, based from the same book:
The unsafe act is the negligence that lead to occurrence of an 
accident by breach of the existing and accepted safety 
procedure.
The unsafe condition is ‘a harmful physical condition or 
situation which could directly allow the occurrence of an 
accident.’
Classification of unsafe acts or conditions according to the ANSI Z16.2-1962 
(R1969) code:
Unsafe Practices
• Unauthorised operation
• Failure to warn or secure
• Improper speed operation
• Making safety devices inoperable
• Using defective equipment
• Improper usage of equipment
• Failure to use protective equipment
• Improper loading or stowage, lashing
• Improper lifting
• Taking improper position
• Drinking alcohol or drugs
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Unsafe Conditions
• Inadequate guards or protection
• Defective tooIs,equipment,substances
• Congestion
• Inadequate warning system
• Fire and explosion hazards
• Hazardous atmospheric conditions
• Excessive noise
• Radiation exposures
• Inadequate illumination or ventilation
• Substandard housekeeping
The topics given above are good variations of substandard practices and conditions or 
unsafe acts and conditions. But, all of them have one important thing in common, a 
symptom of the basic cause permitting potential substandard practices and condition 
to occur. Keeping these things in mind, means keeping the domino principle from 
existing.
2.13 Maritime disaster: Its valuable lessons
After reviewing the statistical data, both in the Philippine domestic and International 
scenes, regarding maritime casualty, one can usually make certain guiding 
assumptions which, while not eliminating all the wrong possibilities, would direct 
investigator toward the most likely cause of the casualty. It is noted that almost a 
half and a quarter of the casualties, from 1990 to 1996, were those vessels involved in 
Foundering and Wreck/stranding situations. According to the data, the common 
factor resulting to these accidents is due to rough sea condition, reinforced by some 
other factors such as cracks in the hull allowing ingress of water, which causes 
flooding. Flooding may also be caused as a result of water coming in from the hatch. 
Ships are vulnerable to flooding, because they have the tendency to capsize due to the 
free surface effect. From the sited causes above, some of them or even all could be 
the possible cause of vessels missing, though vessels involved here shows a very small 
percentage of the casualties. The same goes with the Philippine’s grounding 
incidents, aside from factors that have just been cited, the result of over confidence 
where in positions fixes were sometimes being neglected was also a contributing
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factor. From this, the shipping company has also got a significant part in the 
occurrence of that incident. It is the company’s responsibility to rectify everything 
that may compromise the safety of their ships.
Fire which started in the engine room seems to be the common amongst the ships 
involved here, like general cargo ships. It is amazing that vessels engaged in fishing 
has the most number of these accidents. It could be assumed that fishermen only has 
a limited knowledge regarding safety or the safety precautions are just being ignored 
as well as lack of fire fighting equipment. The second one following fishing vessels 
are general cargo vessels. Due to carelessness is the possible cause. As an example, 
failure to turn off hot plates after cooking and smoking in restricted areas and in bed. 
In some cases, making proper rounds is one important factor of safety which may 
have not been taken. Failure to do so, could mean, allowing the given examples to 
exit.
In the case of the collision, it appears that most of them happened during poor 
visibility. Poor seamanship is one factor here. Based from the book ^Collision and 
Their Causes’ by R. A. Cahill, collision in restricted visibility occurred due to a 
simple assumption, which makes things worse, tending to forget to plot the target. In 
some cases, speed is one factor. Not proceeding at safe speed in poor visibility tends 
to give not enough ample time to take evasive actions. Finally, if look out was 
properly carried out, it could have been the basis of assessment for positive actions 
against critical situations.
To conclude from the preceding discussion, there is a lot more to learn from all types 
of casualties ranging from a variety of causes such as mechanical/system failure, ship 
design, communication, and human element which is the most significant factor.
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Chapter III
Education and Training:
Key to safety awareness and consciousness.
3.1 Casualty lessons: Problems in disseminating.
As we leam more about the causes of maritime casualties, yet the problem is the 
spreading of important and vital lessons from these casualties. As far as Philippine 
maritime institutions are concerned, none at the moment have a particular subject 
concerned with casualties and the reports from these.
Therefore, information to the students about what causes accidents does not exist. 
Only a few other possibilities exist to build the students’ safety awareness. Unlike, if 
casualty lessons were taught and inculcated during the students’ formative years, 
safety awareness and consciousness would gradually build-up, making a strong safety 
foundation once the students have reached their professional career.
Apart from the problem mentioned above, casualty investigating team, merely 
conducts an investigation for law enforcement, and also find reason for the damage 
accident.
3.2 Role of maritime institutions: Starting them young.
Training for safer maritime operations has the potential in saving lives, minimising 
injuries, avoiding pollution, and protecting the economic investments in ships and
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cargoes. Such training needs to be given to the young people who enter the industry 
and should be continuously provided as they progress on to new responsibilities. 
Education and training for safe operations needs to be improved in a way that the 
students would gain a sense of safety awareness in them. This can perhaps be done by 
introducing the reasons of maritime accidents into the curricula for becoming officers 
of the watch. We should learn from others mistakes, by inculcating into young 
people’s mind the risks involved in the of ship’s operation, where a slight mistake 
could cause disaster.
3.3 Philippine Merchant Marine Academy (PMMA): A model institution.
The PMMA is the only state maritime academy in the Philippines. It has taken the 
initiative in promoting professionalised maritime careers by establishing standards and 
criteria, based from STCW Conventions, that meet the skills and competency required 
by the maritime industry; domestically and internationally.
3.3.1 History
The PMMA, by virtue of a Spanish Royal Decree, was established on April 5, 1820. 
It was originally named Escuela Nuutica de Manila. Until sometime in 1863, an 
earthquake destroyed the school which was then located inside the Walled City of 
Intramuros. Which also for the same reason, the school had moved to several 
locations within the City of Manila. The school was set under the civil government 
before the end of the Spanish Regime.
The Nautical school, as recognised by the American authorities, was re-named 
Nautical School of the Philippine Islands and re-opened on December 15, 1899. 
Immediately after the re-opening, a provision was made and started construction to 
house an average enrolee of 150 cadets. The facilities were provided by the 
government in an effort to raise the standard.
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For a very short period of time, the school changed its name to Philippine Nautical 
School (PNS) in 1900 and was classified as an insular school. In 1907, it was closed 
due to lack of financial support. The school was again re-opened in 1913, to answer 
the urgent need for trained merchant marine officers, as recommended by Don Ramon 
Fernandez who then was the President of the Philippine Shipowners’ Association’s.
Before World War II broke out. Captain Francisco Castaneda headed the school with 
Lieutenant Andrada, a U.S. Naval Academy graduate, as the first Filipino Executive 
Officer. During the war, the PNS was expanded not only to cater for the nautical 
officers but also for marine engineers, as well as ordinary seamen.
In the 1950’s, school was revived under the Department of National Defence. Due 
to lack of legislative support and facilities and an acute need for Filipino merchant 
marine officers in the 1950’s, the school was transferred under the Bureau of Public 
Schools as its Vocational Division, which resulted in a deterioration of the standard of 
maritime education and training of the school.
The Republic Act 3680 converted the Philippine Nautical School into the Philippine 
Merchant Marine Academy (PMMA) in 1963. It offered four years courses 
conferring the degree of Bachelor of Science in Marine Transportation (BSMT) major 
in Navigation and Seamanship or in Steam Engineering and Electricity. Automatically 
its graduates were granted Third Mate and Fourth Marine Engineer licenses without 
taking the Professional Regulation Commission Board Examination. The cadets were 
required to live in the campus for their first, second and fourth academic years. The 
third year was programmed for supervised shipboard training. Captain Rogelio 
Morales was then the Superintendent of PMMA. At this time, the PMMA curriculum 
was based on the United States Merchant Marine Academy (USMMA), because the 
Academy’s Academic Dean was a Kings Pointer, Commander Emilio Prieto.
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3.3.2 An overview of the PMMA’s educational and training system 
First of all, the author would like to deal only on the academy’s four years course 
programme. In addition, special attention will be given only on the curricular area of 
nautical discipline, which is the degree on Bachelor of Science in. Marine 
Transportation major in Nautical Studies (BSMT-NS). The professional stage will 
not be tackled because of its irrelevancy to the main topic.
The BSMT-NS course is offered to young boys or girls, who either just came fresh 
from secondary school level A\dth at least sixteen years of age or have a college 
background, see Aimex 3, provided that they are not more than twenty-one years of 
age. The primary function of educating and training is to convey the cadets of the 
necessary knowledge and skills, which is also the prime needs being looked at by 
maritime industry both nationally and internationally, for a watchkeeping career at sea. 
Advanced educational programme is the ideal kind of education that would cultivate 
the intellectual, social, morale, and physical development of the cadets.
The cadets are being housed in for the entire three academic years. The only chance 
they have outside of the academy premises or to be with their families is during the 
weekends, Saturdays and Sundays, summer vacations, and sometimes special 
Holidays. The reasons of which, to give them orientation of the life at sea away from 
their families. The academy has a kind of approach to educational process, which 
makes it very special and unique from all the rest. The educational process is viewed 
along an academic preparation and an indoctrination into the life of a mariner using 
discipline to strengthen the approach. This is known as the dualistic approach.
The academic preparation is being done and handled by the three departments, 
namely; the Department of Arts and Science, the Department of Marine Engineering, 
and the Department of Marine Transportation. These departments require the cadet 
to get involve with different activities such as study procedures, research.
34
experiments, and critical thinking in group discussion, where English is the medium of 
instruction and communication.
Aside from academic preparation, the indoctrination is being done and handled by the 
Department of Midshipman’s Affair. The social values and motivations of a maritime 
career is being introduced to the cadets. Furthermore, a sense of commitment to 
God, Country, and Service is also developed. The core of its teaching method is 
leading by example fortified by drills, physical training, counselling, and disciplinary 
experiences.
The dualistic approach is further enhanced during their naval science tactics classes 
and one year shipboard training period in their second curricular year. Accordingly, a 
tangible sense of patience, of all sorts, is built up in them.
3.3.3 Transition periods of PMMA curriculum
The PMMA has undergone two major changes in curricula both in nautical and 
engineering courses, because of the technological advances and the growing impact of 
STCW Conventions. In 1973, Roberto Q. Moreno was elected President. He revised 
and modified the Academy’s curriculum to answer the growing need in maritime 
development and technology. The course was revised from a BSc in Marine 
Transportation - major in Navigation and Seamanship (BSMT-N/S) to BSc in Marine 
Transportation - major in Nautical Studies (BSMT-NS).
During the period 1981. to 1985, representatives from IMO implemented a three-year 
modernisation of the PMMA training resources. The project was under the joint 
auspices of the Philippine Government and UNDP.
Source: PMMA Research Department
Figure 3.1
Upon the assumption of post by Commodore Gil S. Femanadez in 1989 as the next 
PMMA President, a review and study of the curriculum was conducted and 
subsequently to its revision, placing the shipboard training on the second year which 
was before in the third year. The curriculum, as of 1989 to 1997, was re-designed 
making the first two years as the preparatory stage, consisting of a pre-sea training on 
the first year and a practical shipboard training on its second year, of the school 
programme and professionalism on the last two years, shown in Figure 3.1.
Also emphasising the cadets’ Regimental System’s Honour Code, whereby the cadets 
run their day to day routines with minimal supervision from their Tactical Officers.
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The current curriculum have been the one being followed since 1990 to 1997. It has 
two stages, the preparatory and the pre-professional. The last year of this academic 
period was conceived to prepare the cadets to a well trained and competent Third 
Mates and Fourth Engineers after graduation.
3.4 Conforming to the STCW 1995
The STCW 95 is intended to raise the standards of competence and professionalism of 
seafarers, upon whom the safety of life, property and environment depends. IMO has 
made strong efforts in enforcing the STCW 95 by the concept known as ‘the white 
list ’. As quoted by Director Loma O. Fajardo, 1997;
the STCW 78 lost its credibility. Why? Because of a lot of sea disasters...
With this loss of credibility, IMO experts said ‘let’s work on the 
Convention.
The white list concept requires all countries to submit a report to IMO by 1 August 
1998 about measures taken to give the Convention full and complete effect. If the 
IMO expert panel is satisfied with the report, then that country will be listed as in 
compliance with the Convention.
With the STCW 95, taking effect on 1st February 1998, the PMMA is, once again, on 
the blink of forcing to modify its curriculum, for maritime studies.
3.4.1 Requirements of STCW 1995
The Convention has specified key areas where demonstrations of required knowledge, 
understanding, and competency has to be followed and incorporated in each curricula.
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Function Code A Table Reference
Navigation A-II/l,p. 27-35; A-II/4,p. 68-69
Cargo Handling A-Il/l,p. 35
Operation of the Ship A-II/l,p.36-38
Personal Survival A-VI/l-l,p. 113-114
Fire Prevention A-VI/l-2,p. 115-117
Elementary First Aid A-Wl-3,p.ll8
Safety and Social Responsibility A-VI/1-4.P. 119-120
Proficiency in Survival Craft A-VI/2-l,p. 123-125
Source; STCW 95
Table 3.1
Code A of the Convention contains mandatory requirements. It is from this part that 
institutional frameworks and curriculum must be based. The areas concerned, shown 
in table 3.1 together with respective code requirements, are included in the PMMA 
BSc curriculum.
3.4.2 Commission on Higher Education (CHED) curricular requirements
“The revision now transferred all detailed requirements to an associated 
code. I hope any schools, every school... can peruse of what is inside.”
L. O. Fajardo, et al
CHED is the sole agency who approves the curricula of each and every institution in 
the Philippines at the higher level of education. The agency have set a minimum 
standard requirements, based on STCW 95 requirements, to be followed by maritime 
institutions, shown in Table 3.2.
38
CHED’s Curricular Requirements for 
Bachelor of Science in Nautical Studies
FIRST YEAR
First Semester . Lec.Hrs. Lab. Hrs. Credit Units
English 1 3 0 3
Mathematics 1 5 0 5
Social Science 1 3 0 3
Seamanship 1 2 3 3 ,
Navigation 1 2 3 3
Safety 1 1 3 2
Compass and Steering 1 3 2
Physical Education 1 1 3 2
Naval Reserve Officers Training Course 0 0 (1.5)
Subtotal 18 15 23 (1.5)
Second Semester Lee. Hrs. Lab. Hrs. Credit Units.
English 2 2 3 3
Mathematics 2 5 0 5
Navigation 2 2 6 4
Seamanship 2 3 0 3
Safety 2 1 0 1
Chemistry 2 3 3
Physical Education 2 1 3 2
Naval Reserve Training Course 0 0 (1.5)
Subtotal 16 15 21 (1.5)
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SECOND YEAR
First Semester Lee. Hrs. Lab, Hrs. Credit Units
Physics 1 3 3 4
Navigation 3 5 6 7
Meteorology and Oceanography 2 3 3
Communication 3 3 4
Physical Education 3 2 0 2
Naval Reserve Officer Training Course 0 0 (1.5)
Subtotal 15 15 20 (1.5)
Second Semester Lee. Hrs. Lab Hrs, Credit Units
Physics 2 3 3 4
Navigation 4 3 3 4
Watchkeeping 3 3 4
MARPOL 3 0 3
Seamanship 3 2 3 3
Physical Education 2 0 2
Naval Reserve Training Course 0 0 (1.5)
Subtotal 16 12 20 (1.5)
THIRD YEAR
First Semester Lee. Hrs. Lab Hrs, Credit Units
English 3 3 0 3
Pilipino 1 3 0 3
Social Science 2 3 0 3
Merchant Ships Search and Rescue 3 0 3
Mar. E - Ships’ Power Plant 1 3 2
Electronic Navigation 2 3 3
Seamanship 4 1 3 2
Subtotal 16 9 19
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Second semester Lee. Hrs. Lab. Hrs.
Credit Units t
Filipino 2 3 0 3
Social Science 3 3 0 3
Social Science 4 3 0 3
Management 3 0 3
Basic Computer 1 3 2
Maritime Law and IMO Convention 5 0 5
English 4 3 0 3
Subtotal 21 3 22
CADETSHIP
One year Deck Cadetship - on board vessels more than 500 gross tonnage.
40 credit units (20 Units per Semester)
Seagoing service should be supervised; should include bridge watchkeeping duties under supervision of the 
Master or a Qualified Officer and documented in an approved training record book.
GRAND TOTAL NUMBER OF UNITS: 165 (including deck cadetship)
Source: CHED, 1997
Table 3.2
CHED was recently appointed by the Lead Agency, the Maritime Industry Authority 
(MARINA), to handle the monitoring of all maritime institutions in the country. It is 
stated in Article V/14-17 of CHED Memorandum Order Number 51; Series of 1997, 
known as the ‘Policies, Standards, and Guidelines for Maritime Education. This 
article includes concise requirements for the curriculum.
The curricular structure, table 3.2, was designed to be able to conform and comply 
with the STCW 95. Additionally giving the Philippines the necessary boost to reach 
the IMO white list.
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3.5 Revision to a standard curriculum
The PMMA curriculum is based on the STCW 95 and the CHED curricular 
requirements. In June 1998, the latest revision and changes to its curriculum took 
effect and is now being implemented. One will surely ask, ‘why has not the 
Convention been implemented until then?’ This is mainly due to difficulties which the 
PMMA have encountered in the present decade.
The purchase of new and proper equipment and simulators, including the amendments 
to the curriculum, have to be put aside for a while, until a complete transfer of the 
PMMA headquarters was ready. For this reason, the revision and implementation of 
the latest curriculum was delayed. According to Lloyd’s List, July 24 1998. The 
PMMA made it for the white list.
3.5.1 PMMA Bachelor of Science in Marine Transportation-Nautical Studies 
curriculum, as amended
Based on the STCW 95 and CHED’s curricular requirements, PMMA BSMT-NS 
curriculum have been established. Following next page is the PMMA’s curricular 
structure and contents now being implemented as of the year 1998.
PMMA BSMT-NS Curriculum
FIRST YEAR
First Semester Lee. Hrs. Lab. Hrs. Credit Units
English 1 - Communication Arts 3 0 3
Math 1 - College Algebra and Plane Geometry 5 0 5
Social Science 1 - General Psychology with Drug and
Alcohol Prevention
3 0 3
Seamanship 1 - Ship Construction and Practical 
Seamanship
2 3 3
Navigation 1 - Tenestrial Navigation 1 2 3 3
Safety 1 - Medical Aid, Personal Survival Techniques, 
Personal Safety and Social Responsibility, Fire 
Fighting and Prevention
1 3 2
Compass and Steering 1 . 3 2
Physical Education 1 - Basic Swimming 1 3 2
Naval Reserve Officers Training Course 0 0 (1.5)
Subtotal 18 15 23 (1.5)
Second Semester Lee. Hrs. Lab. Hrs. Credit Units
English 2 - Standard Marine Communication 2 3 3
Math 2 - Solid Mensuration and Spherical Geometry 5 0 5
Navigation 2 - Terrestrial Navigation 2 2 6 4
Seamanship 2 - Cargo Handling and Stowage 3 0 3
Safety 2 - Emergency Procedures 1 0 1
Chemistry - General Chemistry 2 3 3
Physical Education 2 - Advance Swimming 1 3 2
Naval Reserve Training Course 0 0 (1.5)
Subtotal 16 15 21 (1.5)
SECOND YEAR
One year shipboard training - on board vessels more than 500 gross tonnage.
40 Credit Units (20 Units per Semester)
Seagoing service is supervised including bridge watchkeeping duties under the 
supervision of the Master or a Qualified Office documented in an approved training
record book
THIRD YEAR
First Semester Lee. Hrs. Lab. Hrs. Credit Units
Physics 1 - Engineering Physics 3 3 4
Navigation 3 - Celestial Navigation 5 6 7
Meteorology and Oceanography 2 3 3
Ships Communication - Visual Signalling and Radio
Conununications
3 3 4
Physical Education 3 - Sports 2 0 2
Naval Reserve Officer Training Course 0 0 (1.5)
Subtotal 15 IS 20 (1.5)
Second Semester Lee. Hrs. Lab Hrs. Credit Units
Physics 2 - Engineering Physics 2 3 3 4
Navigation 4 - Radar and ARPA 3 3 4
Watchkeeping 3 3 4
MARPOL - Maritime Pollution and Prevention 3 0 3
Seamanship 3 - Stability and Trim 2 3 3
Physical Education 4 - Self-Defense 2 0 2
Naval Reserve Training Course 0 0 (1.5)
Subtotal 16 12 20 (1.5)
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FOURTH YEAR
First Semester Lee. Hrs. Lab Hrs. Credit Units
English 3 - Correspondence and Technical Report
Writing
3 0 3
Filipino 1 - Sining ng Pakikipagtalastasan 3 0 3
Social Science 2 - Philippine History and Constitution 3 0 3
Merchant Ships Search and Rescue 3 0 3
Mar. E - Ships’ Power Plant 1 3 2
Electronic Navigational Aids 2 3 3
Seamanship 4 - Ship Handling and Manoeuvring 1 3 2
Naval Reserve Officer Training Course 0 0 (1.5)
Subtotal 16 9 19 (1.5)
Second semester Lee. Hrs. Lab. Hrs. Credit Units
Filipino 2 - Panitikan Filipino 3 0 3
Social Science 3 - Life and Works of Rizal 3 0 3
Social Science 4 - Foreign Society and Culture 3 0 3
Management - Shipboard Personnel Management 3 0 3
Basic Computer 1 3 2
Maritime Law and IMO Convention 5 0 5
English 4 - Foreign Language 3 0 3
Naval Reserve Officer Training Course 0 0 (1.5)
Subtotal 21 3 22 (1.5)
Source: Department of Marine Transportation, PMMA
Table 3.3
3.6 A Review of the technical subject areas
An analysis of the relevant subject areas needs to be carried out in order to find out 
whether casualty topic in the curriculum exists or not. The author will deal only with 
technical subjects concerning ships and their operation. The followdng are subjects to 
be reviewed:
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• Seamanship 1-4
• Navigation 1-4
• Safety 1-2
• Compass and Steering
• Meteorology and Oceanography
• Communication
• Watchkeeping
• MARPOL
• Merchant Ships Search and Rescue
• Electronic Navigational Aids
• Shipboard Personnel Management
• Maritime Law and IMO Conventions
3.6.1 Subject descriptions for analysis
Seamanship 1-4. These subjects deals with the basic knowledge needed for a person 
working aboard ship, which ought to be taught before embarking for cadetship. It is 
also the basis of a becoming watchkeeping officer. The following is the summary of 
this basic:
• the principal structural members of a ship and its various parts and a 
working knowledge of a practical seamanship;
• the preparation and dunnaging of holds, the operation of ships’ cargo gear 
and the awareness of the importance of adequate securing cargo to prevent 
damage to ship or cargo. In addition, identification of dangerous goods, 
that they are to be stowed and separated according to the requirements of 
the IMDG Code. Furthermore, knowing the hazards related to some bulk 
cargoes and the precautions to take during their loading and carriage, as well 
as, the knowledge of the piping and pumping arrangement of oil tankers;
• the use of tables and diagrams of stability and trim data for calculating the 
ship’s initial stability, draughts, and trim for any given disposition of cargo 
and other weights. The determination of whether stresses on the ship are 
within permitted limits by the use of stress data or calculating equipment. 
Understanding the fundamental action to take in the event of partial loss of 
intact buoyancy;
• the familiarisation with the manoeuvring information available aboard ship, 
with particular reference to turning circles and stopping distances and how 
they are affected by shallow water, draught, and trim of the ship. The usual 
procedures and actions to take during berthing as well as the immediate 
action to take and the manoeuvres required for the fescue of a man 
overboard.
Navigation 1-4. Without basic knowledge, one will not be able to direct a ship from 
point A to B. The summary of this knowledge is listed, as follows:
• the knowledge and understanding of the basic principles terrestrial 
navigation as a whole;
• the sufficient knowledge and understanding of the subject leading to the 
level of Chief Mate and Master. Apart from this, the reading of information 
from a chart, fix the ship’s position in coastal waters, the conduct of proper 
coastal passage, reading of basic information from the tide tables, as well as, 
the demonstration of a sense of responsibility, independence, and a 
willingness to cooperate with others as part of a bridge team;
• the determination of compass error and calculations for sailing of up to 
twenty four hours using observation of celestial bodies;
• the basic principles and characteristics and the operation of Radar and 
ARPA as well as the application of COLREG in radar plotting for both.
Safety 1-2. In a case of emergency situations, the importance of these subjects is very 
crucial because they deal with the following:
• the knowledge and skills on immediate medicare, personal survival 
techniques, personal safety and social responsibility and firefighting and 
prevention;
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• the reaction in a correct manner during emergency situations, taking charge 
of the preparation, embarkation and launching of survival craft;
• management of boat under oars, sail or motor and taking charge of an 
inflatable liferaft;
• the correct use of all survival equipment and actions to preserve the lives of 
those in their charge.
Compass and Steering. This subject covers the basic principles of the necessary 
instruments on the bridge that require direction. The knowledge to be given is as 
follows:
• the basic theory of magnetism and magnetic compass;
• the basic theory of gyro compasses and automatic pilots;
• the routine maintenance and the limitations of these instruments;
• the great emphasis on a knowledge of instrument errors, adjustments, and 
the importance of frequent checking and ways of doing it.
Meteorology and Oceanography. The subject covers natural phenomena around the 
ship and the instruments used to measure these forces. Knowledge to be acquired, is 
as follows:
• the understanding of meteorology and oceanography to be able to apply it 
for the safe operation of the ship;
• the knowledge of shipborne meteorological and oceanographical instruments 
and their application;
• the knowledge of the characteristics of various weather systems, ocean 
currents, waves, and ice on the sea;
• the reporting procedures and recording systems and the ability to apply the 
meteorological and oceanographical information available;
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• the knowledge gained from the above will serve as a basis for further 
training to the level of chief mate and master.
Communications. In order to decode messages and the intentions behind them is a 
basic knowledge that must be pursued to clarify such actions or intentions. The 
knowledge to be covered is the following:
• the knowledge of the basic Morse code and also the correct procedures to 
enable to transmit and receive messages by Morse light;
• the knowledge of the flags of International Code Signals and the significant 
of the single-letter signals;
• the procedures use in radiotelephone communications and be able to use 
radiotelephones, particularly with respect to distress, urgency, safety, and 
navigational messages;
• the knowledge of the radiocommunications requirements of the SOLAS 
Convention, as amended, and the procedures for distress, urgency, safety, 
and navigational messages in accordance with Chapter IX of the Radio 
Regulations.
Watchkeeping. Keeping a sharp look-out is one of the vital keys for the safety of the 
ship, crew, and cargo. The subject talks about a proper vigilance on the bridge with 
due considerations of Regulations, which will be mentioned in the following:
• the thorough knowledge of the International Regulations for Preventing 
Collision at Sea (COLREG 1972) and its applications during a navigational 
watch;
• the capability of keeping an adequate and efficient watch, both at sea and in 
port, taking into account the content of the Regulations II/l of the 1978 STCW 
Convention.
49
MARPOL. This subject covers the requirements of the MARPOL Convention 73/78. 
The topics to be tacked are as follows:
• the basic working knowledge on the provisions of the MARPOL Convention 
73/78 and its application;
• the knowledge of the precautions to be taken to prevent pollution of the 
marine environment;
• anti-pollution procedures and all associated equipment;
• effects of the operational and accidental pollution of the marine 
environment;
• the basic environmental protection procedures.
Merchant Ships’ Search and Rescue. This subject is very important when dealing 
with ship in distress. A vessel in distress, in the middle of the ocean, is like finding a 
needle in a haystack. It requires certain techniques when proceeding into the target 
area. The subject gives the necessary knowledge on how to conduct search and 
rescue. They are as follows:
the knowledge of the content of the IMO Merchant Ship Search and Rescue 
Manual (MERSAR);
the structure of search and rescue organisation;
the planning of the search and rescue services;
the communication practices and procedures;
the SAR responses;
the patterns and techniques;
the conduct of search;
the search and rescue units;
the rescue of survivors;
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• the emergency assistance;
• the ship reporting systems and search and rescue training requirement.
Electronic Navigational Aids. Aside from those topics covered by the Navigation 
subjects, this covers an additional knowledge about the use of electronic aids to 
navigation. The subject talks about the following areas:
• the basic theory of electronic navigational aids and the use of appropriate 
instruments;
• the fundamental differences between the various systems and the methods of 
using these systems to obtain the ship’s position;
• the basic theory of the Radio Direction-Finders and its proper handling and 
the application of information correctly;
• the general principles of the Echo Sounders and Speed Log;
• the familiarisation with the method of recording and displaying the 
information.
Shipboard Personnel Management. To handle situations involving people in a 
smooth way is not an easy task. Officers must possess leadership. The areas covered 
by this subject are the following;
• the capability of organising and managing the crew for the safe and efficient 
operation of the ship;
• the ability to draw up an organisation for dealing with emergencies;
• the basic knowledge and principles of human relations on board, staff 
attitudes, exercise of authority, gross behaviour, conditions of emplo3mient, 
analysis of work allocation of staff
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Maritime Law and IMO Conventions. This is rather the most important subject to be 
carried out. In order to become a watchkeeping officers up to master, relevant rules 
and regulations needs to be studied and understood. Following are the areas covered;
• cognisant with the certificates required to be on board, their period of 
validity and the procedures for their renewal;
• awareness of the legal obligations and responsibilities concerning national 
and international provisions for the safety of the ship, crew, passengers, and 
cargo and for the prevention of pollution from the ship.
Ship‘s Power Plant. This is a newly introduced subject that gives the cadets the basic 
knowledge of ship’s engines. It covers the following areas:
• basic knowledge of the principles and operations of different types of 
machinery on board ships;
• the familiarity with and ability to correct usage of common engineering 
terms.
3.7 Subject analysis
A thorough review and investigation of the relevant subjects which are directly linked 
to ship and its operation, reveals that only one accident related matter is mentioned 
and that in only one of the subjects, namely MARPOL. It only describes the effect of 
pollution to the marine environment. It discusses only on the duration of how long a 
pollutant will subside, either by evaporation or sinkage or even drifting into the open 
sea. In some instances like in Seamanship 1-4, it only tackles preventive measure to 
protect the ship and its cargo. In Watchkeeping, it deals \wth COLREG 73/78 but 
then only to its knowledge and applications. The same with Safety, where the subject 
is on how to behave in emergency situations. The other subjects, covers only the 
areas they represent.
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Maritime casualties itself could be an important topic to be studied and lessons to be 
learnt. With the data gathered and an analysis of its areas, the author has arrived to 
the conclusion that no area emphasises maritime casualties and its vital lessons.
3.8 Selected maritime accidents for case analysis
Fire/Explosion
Ship’s Name Cause(s) Source
Morro Castle (1934) Inadequate fire fighting
appliances / fire drills
Cahill (1), p. 96
Lakonia (1963) Inadequate crew training and
discipline allowed fire to spread
and interfered with launching
boats
Cahill (1), p. 130
Berge Istra (1975) Ignition of inflammable vapour
from the double bottom tank.
Cahill (1), p. 149
Berge Vanga (1979) Explosion due to inadequate
method of tank cleaning.
Cahill (1), p. 155
Betelgeuse (1979) Caught fire when vessel broke
in half and subsequently
exploded
Cahill (1), p. 169
MARS Report No. 94009 Engine leak resulting to ignition MARS R16(1994), p.l7
Dredger report Engine room fire MAIB (1997), p. 11
Ro-Ro ferry report Crankcase explosion MAIB (1997), p. 10
Stranding
Ship’s Name Cause(s) / Situation Source
Torrey Canyon (1967) Misjudgement Cahill (1), p. 198
Argo Merchant (1976) Improper look-out Cahill (1), p. 203
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Amoco Cadiz (1977) Mechanical failure Cahill (1), p. 206
Exxon Valdez (1989) Delayed action Cahill (1), p. 214
Donacilla (1967) At anchor Cahill (3). p. 53
Comhusker Mariner (1953) At anchor Cahill (3), p. 50
Esso Cambria (1970) Fatigue Cahill (3), p. 106
Seaspeed Dana (1980) Fatigue/lack of skill Cahill (3), p. 109
Bel Hudson (1970) Fatigue/Drunkenness Cahill (3), p. 112
Sea Empress (1996) Pilot error Seaways (1997), p. 3
Braer(1993) Engine trouble MARS R21(1994), p. 19
Official Reports (1994) . Human error MARS R16(1994), p.l8
Official Reports (1997) Lack of Pilot-officer
communication
MARS R60(1997), p. 19
Royal Majesty (1995) Over-reliance on Integrated
Navigation System
MAIB (1997), p. 5
Algolake (1994) Notices to shipping not
heeded
MAIB (1997), p. 26
General cargo report mechanical failure MAIB (1997), p. 8
Contact
Ship’s Name Situation Source
Aghios Gerrasimos-Arya
Rokh (1975)
Anchorage Cahill (2), p. 145
Coral I-Neil Armstrong
(1977)
Anchorage Cahill (2), p. 147
Niija Berthing operations MAIB (1997), p. 28
Collision
Ship’s Name Situation Source
Andrea Doria-Stockholm (1956) Restricted visibility Cahill (1), p. 180
Venpet-Venoil (1977) Restricted visibility Cahill (l),p. 185
Aegean Captain-Atlantic Empres
(1979)
Restricted visibility Cahill (1), p. 192
Steel Designer-Atlantic Trader
(1968)
Restricted visibility Cahill (2), p.lO
Fabiola-Bonifaz (1964) Restricted visibility Cahill (2), p. 12
Gill netter-Trawler Restricted visibility MAIB(1997),p.41
Horta Barbosa-Sea Star (1972) Head-on Cahill (2), p. 44
Statue of Liberty-Andulo (1965) Crossing Cahill (2), p. 60
Cardo-Toni (1969) Crossing Cahill (2), p. 63
Manuel Campos-Auriga (1973) Overtaking Cahill (2), p. 81
Fishing vessel-Unidentified coaster Overtaking MAIB (1997), p. 39
Diego Silang-Vysotsk-Brazilian
Faith (1976)
Overtaking Cahill (2), p. 68
Foundering
Ship’s Name Cause(s) Source
Flying Enterprise (1952) Crack in the hull/heavy list Cahill (l),p. 66
Pamir (1957) Cargo shift Cahill (1), p. 80
Marine Electric (1983) Flooding Cahill (1), p. 86
Leisure craft report Severe gale MAIB (1997), p. 47
Motor cruiser report Rolled heavily/flooding MAIB (1997), p. 50
Sources:
Cahill (1) - Disasters at Sea by R A Cahill
Cahill (2) - Collisions and Their Causes by R A Cahill
Cahill (3) - Strandings and Their Causes by R A Cahill
MARS - Marine Accident Reports, In: Seaways.
E T Gates - Maritime Accidents: What went wrong?
J H Coote - Total Loss
MAIB - Safety Digest by Marine Accident Investigation Branch
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Chapter IV
Inclusion of Maritime Casualty in the Existing PMMA
BSMT-NS Curriculum
With the thorough review of the current curriculum, stated in Chapter III, particularly 
the identification on the possible technical areas, it is then realised that the curriculum 
lacks a sort of a binding method to make the areas mentioned more concrete. This 
could be done by the introduction of a casualty related topic. In this way, a much 
more competent merchant marine officers could be developed.
4.1 A new syllabus for maritime casualty
Without an insight of casualties and its lessons, a sense of safety consciousness and 
awareness could never be built up in mind. It goes without saying, that everybody 
learns from mistakes, so, mistakes or faults incurred in every accident should be 
studied. Therefore, a topic on casualties should be introduced with separate syllabus 
in the curriculum. The main reasons of which are:
• experiences from casualties are all represented in technical areas of the 
curriculum;
• a lesson on casualties enhances the knowledge and skill gained from the 
three and a half years of the cadets’ formative or academic years, giving
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them a more solid and concrete background knowledge of their future 
maritime career; and,
• from casualty lessons, a sense of safety awareness and consciousness will be 
followed by the cadets.
4.2 The maritime casualty syllabus
Before carrying out casualty lessons, prerequisite subjects must be taken, in order to 
appreciate the subject. In reference to the BSMT-NS curriculum, see Table 3.3, the 
maritime casualty subject should be given in the later part of the study programme. In 
this way, the cadets have already acquired the necessary knowledge and skill to fully 
understand the lessons and be able to analyse the probabilities and key factors which 
have caused the casualty.
The Proposed Casualty Syllabus
Subject Title: Maritime Casualty
Prerequisite: Satisfactory completion of five academic semesters.
Contact Hours: Lecture Hours =34.5
Laboratory Hours = 54 
Total Hours 88.5 (Last Semester)
Scope: The subject enhances the knowledge and skills gained from previous
academic years intensified by extensive use of group activities, case studies, and role 
playing in order to augment investigative and analytical skills.
Objectives: On completion of the subject, the students will be able...
• to improve critical thinking in carrying out duties and responsibilities;
• to identify the aspects relating to dangers in navigation and immediately 
response and apply evasive action in critical situations;
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• to conduct, organise, and analyse investigation in accordance with the 
national law and legislation of the State concerned.
SUBJECT OUTLINE
Subject Area Lect Hrs Lab. Hrs.
Introduction 15 min.
International Obligations
• Conventions and protocols
• Convention provisions touching on accident
investigation
• Resolutions and circulars
3 Hrs.
Investigative Purposes and Procedures 
• Purposes and types of investigation
9 Hrs. 45 min. 10 Hrs. 30 min.
• Initiation of investigation
• Documentary evidence
• Physical evidence
• Examination of witnesses
• Records of testimony
• Liaison with other authorities
Analysis of Evidence
• General aspects
• Technical aspects
• Human aspects
• Determination of sequence of events and causal
factors
8 Hrs. 15 min. 3 Hrs.
Inquiry Reports 2 Hrs. 11 Hrs. 30 min.
• Content of reports
• Attachment of documentary evidence
Administration of Investigations 9 Hrs.
• Enabling legislation
• Appointment of investigators
• Guidance to investigators
• Informal inquiries
• Preliminary inquiries
• Formal hearings
• The investigator’s administrative roles at formal 
hearings
• The investigator’s advisory role at formal hearings
• Appearance at formal hearing
• Co-operation with other States
• Costs of inquiries and hearings
Findings and recommendations 2 Hrs. 30 min.
• Recommendations on standards
• Recommendations on research
• Dissemination of information
• Implications of investigation results
• Submissions to IMO 
Group Activity Case Studies
11 tlrs.
17 Hrs.
Source: IMO Model Course 3.11
Table 4.1
4.3 Methodologies
To proceed training in the technical area, it is first required to analyse the syllabus, 
Table 4.1, and the academic knowledge at hand. A pre-entry knowledge, of course, is 
required to support the technical training elements concerned at appropriate points 
within the technical subject. The analysis therefore dictates that it is better to locate 
the technical subject in the later part of the academic period, preferably in the last 
semester.
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The concised outlined topic areas shown in Table 4.1, are done in such a manner that 
it covers almost all of the subject matters in the curriculum. The outlined topics 
harmonise the subjects that had been taken and still are to be taken, in the last 
academic period. Adjustments have to be looked into during its incorporation. Such 
adjustments are: subject objective, scope, and content, if necessary; in connection to 
the topics to be delivered in relation to the actual level of knowledge and skill of the 
cadets, and which are going to be in conflict with those subjects in the last semester
In order to compensate adjustments, the instructor needs to minimise emphasis on 
subject areas already attained by the cadets. Furthermore, any knowledge, skill or 
technical training which the cadets have not yet acquired should be identified.
The allotted time indicated within the course. Table 4.2, may also be necessary to 
adjust. It must be realised that time allocation is uncontrolled, provided that pre-entry 
requirements have been met. Therefore, a review of the time allocation needs to be 
conducted for further re-allocation of time to achieve the learning objectives.
4.4 Lesson plans
The lesson plans should be drawn up, based on the syllabus, after course content and 
revisions of any have been adjusted for proper cadet intake. The lesson plans should 
be done in a simple way consisting of key words to help instructor with his 
presentation of materials; and also to be done in the manner that objective(s) is 
indicated so that the cadets will have an idea on what knowledge or skills will be 
acquired. To assist the instructor in cany out group activities, a list of proposed case 
studies is given in the last part of Chapter three.
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The Proposed Casualty Subject Schedule 
for the Last Academic Semester (20 weeks)
Week Specific Topics Lee. Hrs. Lab. Hrs.
1-5 Introduction
International obligation
Investigative purposes and procedures
13.5 9
6-8 Analysis of Evidence
• General aspects
• Technical aspects
• Human aspects
10.5 3
9-11 Inquiry Reports 3 10.5
12-16 Administration of Investigations 9 12
16-20 Findings and Recommendations 2.5 18.5
Source: IMO Model Course 3.11, modified by the author.
Notes: 1. One week = 4.5 Hours of lectures, including laboratory hours.
2. Laboratory hours stands for group activities (Case Studies)
Table 4.2
4.5 Guidance on Assessment
The effectiveness of transferred knowledge in all subject areas may be assessed by 
rephrasing the learning objectives as questions. In this case, the provided learning 
objectives is the basis for the construction of suitable tests for assessing the progress 
of the cadets’. Individual or group activity or the whole class may be orally assessed, 
for the attainment of learning objectives in topic like the international obligations.
The ways to carry out assessment could be from a simple ‘question and answer’ 
discussion to a more objective or subjective tests, with either to an individual or the
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group or the whole class. But, ‘tricky’ questions must be avoided, as it may create 
confusion to the whole class, in relation to the knowledge to be achieved.
Therefore, the accuracy of the description of what is to be measured dictates the 
effectiveness of the assessment.
4.6 Method of scoring
It is the instructor’s discretion to also have or rather formulate his own scoring 
method, provided that such criteria should be identified and looked into as a guidance 
for assessing the various tests conducted. The following is a list of criteria to be met 
in the assessment of scores:
• the ability to recall the previous information, during an objective 
test;
• the cognitive use of data from charts, sketches, drawings, etc.;
• the ability in writing a report;
• the demonstration of an attained practical skill;
• the demonstration of oral and written description of procedures.
4.6.1 Sample of scoring
The academy has two sets of major examinations (mid-term and final examinations), 
apart from minor tests and alike. Likewise, it also has a method of scoring 
assessment. It would be wise to follow the same with few minor alterations, like 
what was mentioned in 4.6 of the same chapter.
ONE SEMESTER
Mid-term examination (50%) + Final examination (50%) = Total score (100%)
Mid-terni/fmal examination:
Attendance Oral tests Quizzes Case studies Examination Total
10% 15% 15% 20% 40% = 100 %
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4.7 Problems that may be encountered
There are a number of difficulties to be encountered in a smooth and effective 
conduct of the subject that arise from; a qualified instructor, financial constrains, and 
availability of reference materials such as textbooks, casualty reports from 
periodicals, etc. In the advent of STCW 95, resulting to the closure of a high 
percentage of maritime schools in the country, has a high impact not only in the 
industry’s need of manpower quotas but also in the administration of these students in 
the remaining maritime schools. In effect, staff-student ratios may also post problem.
There are people who are qualified to handle the proposed subject. Aside from 
master mariners or senior officers, who are presently working in the academy, there 
also are a number of well-trained professionals, who have had their knowledge 
acquired at World Maritime University (WMU). Moreover, top management people 
in shipping companies, who have a vested interest in the ihatter, could be asked as 
guest lecturers to share their knowledge and experiences. As mentioned by Captain 
del Castillo last year, an alumnus himself and one of the top ranking managers in his 
company, is willing to assist because a number of cadets will later man their vessels 
both during the shipboard training period and after graduation. If inadequate 
availability of instructors, support staff must be considered to compensate for the 
time allotted for the subject. There are also WMU graduates who are holding key 
positions in the academy. They can fill the gap, in a form of pro-rata or excess load 
or overtime until a proper instructor has admitted.
Financial problems could be the main issue. As everybody knows, project proposals, 
activities, and alike has always have a bad reputation with regard to budget. We need 
to bear in mind that the shipping world is very dynamic. To keep abreast of national 
and international standards, challenges, and growing technology; certain 
developments must be done. Otherwise, one will be left behind and have a
substandard institution. One cannot afford to lag behind and will surely find ways to
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keep phase with the challenges. This could be done by budget proposal which is 
higher than the previous year, for effectively carrying out the proposed subject.
The academy have a limited amount of learning materials regarding maritime casualty. 
After having achieved the budget proposal, it is easy to acquire necessary materials to 
support the project provided that effort is fully exerted to get in touch with the proper 
entities, national or international, for the proper purchase or acquisition of casualty 
related topics, issues, and reports as well as subscriptions to reinforce case studies, 
assignments, and most of all the learning objectives.
Regarding staff-student ratios, it should be realised that the possibility of hiring 
additional lecturers is necessary and be put in a sort of a contingency plan. Again, the 
recently cited availability of instructors/lecturers is a just enough or even more to 
compensate for the subject’s allotted time. The willingness of concerned people to 
impart knowledge, skills and their dedication are the key components in the transfer 
of knowledge and skill to those being trained.
Chapter V
Conclusion and Recommendations
5.1 Conclusion
IMO has adopted instruments, which mostly is a result from various maritime 
casualties, in order to improve safety in all aspects as well as keeping the oceans free 
from hazardous effects introduced by cargoes with damaging nature. In spite of all 
precautionary measures, a hundred per cent prevention of such accident is uncertain.
Sea accidents may happen anytime. Nothing can be spared from it, not even the most 
advanced ship and its efficient crew. As it seems, accident is like a twin part of any 
ships, just waiting to be triggered by either internal or external factors or both. From 
the factors resulting to casualties, it is noted that eighty per cent of the casualties are 
due to human error.
No one really knows when an accident will strike. In order to minimise the re­
occurrence of accidents and improve safety, a study of casualties needs to be 
introduced so that every officer who is in charge of the watch will be able to detect 
the presence of danger, as early as possible, and act accordingly.
IMO’s goal of world-wide standardisation of competency is STCW 95. Unlike the 
STCW 78, the Revised Convention focuses not only on the knowledge but also on
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the sWll side of an individual. Many maritime institutions, also those in the 
Philippines, are facing challenges in meeting the need of the maritime industry, in 
terms of equipment, education and training, up-dating and other revisions in order to 
conform to more knowledge based. However, only nine schools, out of around one 
hundred twenty-two met the standards and are allowed continuance of their 
operations.
Upon the investigation of the PMMA curriculum casualty topics are nowhere to be 
found. The author strongly believes that with the study of casualties and its causes, 
an awareness and consciousness of the risks involved in the operation of vessels. 
Such a subject will refine the practices, values, and attitudes of an individual. Hence, 
safety in terms of consciousness and awareness will be developed among a new batch 
of officers.
5.2 Recommendations
In retrospect of the facts presented in the preceding chapters, the author strongly 
recommends that the academy should take into consideration the inclusion of a 
casualty subject in its curriculum, on the basis that it enhances the knowledge and 
skills acquired since the beginning of the academic period. Such subject will make the 
new batch of officers fully aware of any situations that they may encounter on board 
ship. Extra precautions, in every decisions, will be built up among them, once they 
assume responsibility. The key words are safety awareness and consciousness.
Because of the PMMA’s status as the only state maritime academy of the Philippines 
and the reputation as the one leading other maritime institutions in the country in 
establishing standards and criteria, it should take another step towards the promotion 
of safety for the benefit not only of the academy itself but also of the world maritime 
industry.
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The author would like to add further recommendations for the proper implementation 
and operation of the subject which may lead to a proper transfer of knowledge and 
skills. The following measures are recommended for proper implementation:
1. Networking. It is very important to consider computer facilities as a 
vital tool for education and training, which has been emphasised in 
the 4th Cycle of the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP), 1988-1992. In this way, maritime institutions may be 
linked together with the lead agency (MARINA), for mutual 
development and benefits, as follows:
• Assistance from the lead agency in providing resources and 
information.
• Opportunity in establishing consultations between schools.
• The possibility of running efficient training, the invitation of an 
expert’s assistance when required. This further updates the 
knowledge of the teaching staff in certain areas.
• A chance to exchange study material and lecturers for the benefit of 
mutual development.
2. Database. It goes without saying that information is knowledge.
The establishment of a casualty archives will serve as a source of 
information. The lead agency will act as the resource centre who 
keeps and provides records relating to maritime casualty. This vrill 
also prompt a proper dissemination of information to the institutions.
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Model Networking and Database 
Figure 5.1
Finally, the author would like to conclude by saying that to keep an accident from 
being repeated, one must have a knowledge of the root cause. As the phrase implies, 
competency is based from quality education and training. Therefore, maritime 
institutions is the key element towards competency.
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Communal Cyclone Path, during 1989
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Annex 2
Casualty Location after Tropical Cyclone, during 1989
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Annex 3
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FUNCTTON: C«rgo hangng and stowage at the operational level.
Campetence Subject where taken Level Year
taken
Semester
11 Monitor the loadin' securine and unloading of cargoes and their cate during the voyage. Seam 2 — Cargc riandling and Stowage 0 1 2
FUNCTION: Controlliirrihe operation of the ihin and care for persona on hoard at the onerational level.
Competence Subject where taken Level Year
taken
Semester
n Fnnire comoliance wiiT-mtlution-Brevention renuirements. Matool — Maries Pollution and Prevention 0 2 2
2) Ikfaintain seatvoithinesrsf the shin. Seam 3 — Stabiienr and Trim O 2 2
3) Pieveni. control and fig2 fires on board. Safety 1 — Medeml Aid, Personal Survival Techniques, Personal 
Safc~and Social Responsibility, Firefighting and 
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0 1 1
4) Operate lifi^saving app=ances. Safety 1 — Mede=il Aid, Personal Survival Techniques, Personal
Safe— and Social Responsibility, Firefighting and 
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0 1 1
5) ^ply medical first aid an board ship. Safety 1 — Mederal Aid, Personal Survival Techniques, Personal
Safer and Social Responsibility, Firefighting and 
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6) Monitor compliance \v=a legislative requirements. Mar Law » Mcrtime Law and IMO Convention 0 3 2
Sttedfiotion af minimu= standard of comiietence In nenonal survival techniques.
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Prev=iion
0 1 1
SDecification of minirauee standard of comnetence in fire prevention and lire fighting.
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CrtM^rffrihAn af minimum ^^dard of coDJDCience in eiemenianf iirsi am.
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Semester
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O
O
1
2
1
2
3) Observe safe working pra<—es. Safely 1 — Medical ^d. Personal Survival Techniques, Personal
Safety a=d Social Responsibility, Firefighting and 
Prevents
O 1 1
4) Understand orders and be aderstood in relation (o shipboard duties Safety 1 - Medical ^d. Personal Survival Techniques, Personal
Safety ssd Social Responsibility, Firefighting and 
Preveni^n
0 1 I
5) Conttibute to effective humzn relationships on board ship. Safety I - Medical ^d. Personal Survival Techniques, Personal
Safety acti Social Responsibility, Firefighting and 
Prevenlica
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and ^evention
Safety 2 - Emergency Procedures
MARPOL - Marine Pollution and Prevention
Nav. 1 - Terrestrial Navigation 1
Nav. 2 - Terrestrial Navigation 2
Nav. 3 - Celestial Navigation
Nav. 4 - Radar and ARPA
E. Nav. - Electronic Navigational Aids
8
2
3
2
1
1
1
3
2
2
5
3
2
9
3
0
3
3
3
0
0
3
6
6
3
3
3
8
11
3
3
3
2
2
1
3
3
4 
7 
4 
3
3
2
3
1
3
1 &3 
3 1 
1 
1 
1 
1
A
nnex 5
Clasalflcatlon/Fleld/Course
Comm. - Visual Signalling & Radio Communication
WK - Watchkeeping
CS • Compass and Steering
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MERSAR - Merchant Ships Search and Rescue
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D. Allied Courses
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